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Chapter 16 
Preparing for the Worst: 
Organizing and Staying Organized 
in the Public Sector 
Tom Juravich and Kate Bronfenbrenner 
The free fall of union membership in the 1970s and 1980s in the U.S. 
private sector was checked by unionization in the public sector. In many 
ways the growth of public-sector employment both masked the dramatic 
decline of private-sector unionization and prevented the wholesale hemor-
rhaging of the labor movement. Although government workers comprise 
only 16 percent of the current workforce, workers covered by collective 
bargaining in the public sector currently make up approximately one-third 
of the membership of the AFL-CIO. 
John F. Kennedy's "Great Society" and Lyndon B. Johnson's "War on 
Poverty" began an era in which the New Deal ethos of government pro-
grams and standards expanded to a whole new range of people and prob-
lems. From 1958 to 1978, the number of government employees leapt from 
7.8 million to more than 15.7 million. Through a combination of major 
public-sector strikes (Burton and Thomason 1988) and political pressure 
on state legislatures and governors (Freeman 1986), this growing number 
of public employees began to secure the right to organize that had been 
given to their counterparts in the private sector. Public-sector union density 
soared from 10.6 percent in 1958 to 38.2 percent in 1977. By 1992, thirty-
eight states provided some collective bargaining rights to at least some 
portion of public employees. 
Until very recently, a combination of political and social pressures acted 
as a restraining mechanism that kept public employers from running 
the same kinds of aggressive antiunion campaigns as their private-sector 
counterparts. As a result, the majority of public-sector workers could 
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choose unions and enjoy labor relations in a climate largely free from the 
threats, intimidation, and coercion that are so commonplace in the private 
sector. 
But a new battleground for labor is erupting in the public sector. In New 
York, Governor George Pataki is proposing reducing the state workforce 
by another seventy-four hundred workers after massive cutbacks his first 
year in office. In New Jersey, Governor Christine Todd Whitman turned 
twenty-three motor vehicle offices over to private contractors and fought an 
aggressive battle against striking toll collectors on the New Jersey Turnpike, 
including offering free passage to travelers over holiday weekends. In Mas-
sachusetts, Governor William Weld is proposing the complete elimination 
of the Department of Motor Vehicles. In New York City, Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani has consistently used the threat of privatization and layoffs to 
force major concessions and work-rule changes from city employee unions. 
Similar threats were used by Governor John Rowland to extract more than 
$200 million in concessions from public-sector unions in Connecticut. In 
other states, such as Oregon, legislatures have directly attacked long-held 
benefits, such as public employee pensions. Across the country, stories such 
as these abound, as a kind of open season has been declared on public 
employees and their unions. 
Although many of these attacks started under the Reagan and Bush ad-
ministrations, they are now for the first time unified under a single ideology 
and political agenda. With the Republican takeover of Congress and the 
ascendancy of Newt Gingrich in 1994, the battle cry to stop government 
intrusion in people's lives and to cut back on big government rang out 
across the country with resounding fervor. According to Gingrich, govern-
ment needs to "devolve" as it abandons New Deal activism in favor of 
the rights and responsibilities of individuals and corporations (1995). As 
dramatized in the shoot-out at Ruby Ridge and the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing, the government has been transmogrified into the new enemy. In a 
dramatic shift, employees who for more than fifty years have worked in the 
"public service" are now being blamed for high taxes, municipal insolvency, 
and the proliferation of unending government regulation and bureaucracy 
(Troy 1994). As we saw in the 1996 federal government shutdowns, public-
sector workers are being sacrificed as part of a larger ideological mission by 
the Republicans. The passage of the welfare reform bill in the fall of 1996 
only further threatened public-sector workers and their unions with its 
extensive workfare provisions. 
Regardless of the precise nature of the attack against public-sector work-
ers and their unions, a rejuvenated and effective organizing program will be 
required to stem the tide—a program no less intensive than the one cur-
rently being proposed for the private sector. Hundreds of thousands of 
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public-sector workers must be organized just to compensate for those lost 
through layoffs and privatization.1 Given the current political alignment, it 
may be increasingly less possible for public-sector unions to use the political 
arena to effect change or to stave off attacks, as public-sector unions have 
traditionally been able to do. In the political arena, as well as in new 
member organizing, public-sector workers and their unions will need to 
develop a more aggressive grassroots organizing strategy if they are to be 
effective in meeting the challenges ahead. 
Over the past three years, we have conducted three studies of public-
sector organizing. These include a national study of all certification, decerti-
fication, and challenge elections in 1991-92 in the thirty-eight states that 
have some form of collective bargaining (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
1995a) and in-depth studies based on survey data collected from lead orga-
nizers from random samples of 195 certification election campaigns (Bron-
fenbrenner and Juravich 1995b and 1995c) and 164 decertification and 
challenge election campaigns (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995d).2 In this 
chapter, we bring these data together for the first time to evaluate the 
current state of public-sector organizing. Specifically, we examine organiz-
ing in the public sector in light of the new attack on public-sector unions 
and workers and evaluate the readiness of the American labor movement 
to rise to meet this challenge. We also evaluate which organizing strategies 
would be most effective in strengthening and expanding the public-sector 
labor movement in this more hostile labor relations climate. 
Public-Sector Certification Elections and Employer Opposition 
Table 16.1 provides an overview of all state and local government elections 
held in 1991-92. A total of 1,912 public-sector certification elections were 
held, in which unions won a stunning 85 percent. This compares with a win 
rate of only 48 percent in the private sector. Unlike the private sector, where 
win rates vary dramatically by unit and occupation, win rates in the public 
sector average more than 80 percent in all types of units, whether composed 
of teachers, police, clerical workers, janitors, or supervisors. 
1. Not only will public-sector unions have to look to unorganized public-sector workers to 
fill their ranks but, as current efforts to privatize continue to escalate, the unions will also need 
to "follow their work" by organizing those workers performing work that has been privatized. 
Some unions, such as SEIU and AFSCME, currently have several efforts under way to organize 
workers performing work that was previously done by state and local workers. One example 
is SEIU's statewide campaign to organize workers in privatized mental health and mental 
retardation centers in Massachusetts. 
2. In the multiunion decertification elections, survey data were collected from the lead 
organizers of both the incumbent and the challenging union campaigns. 
TABLE 16.1. Summary of State and Local Public-Sector Elections Nationwide, 1991-92 
Election Type 
Certifications 
1991 
1992 
1991-92 Total 
Voluntary Recognitions 
1991 Both 
Card checks only 
1992 Both 
Card checks only 
1991-92 Total 
Card checks only 
Number of 
Elections 
956 
956 
1,912 
Union 
Win Rate 
.85 
.85 
.85 
Including Card Checks 
82 
53 
57 
30 
139 
83 
Single-Union Decertifications 
1991 
1992 
1991-92 Total 
85 
77 
162 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
.46 
.44 
.45 
MultiUnion Decertifications (Challenge Elections) 
1991 
1992 
1991-92 Total 
TOTAL 
230 
65.2% turnover 
1.7% no union 
231 
68.0% turnover 
1.3% no union 
461 
66.6% turnover 
1.5% no union 
2,674 
Votes 
Received by 
Winning 
Union 
83% 
84% 
83% 
N.A. 
81% 
N.A. 
93% 
NA 
87% 
74% 
74% 
74% 
73% 
77% 
75% 
Average 
Unit Size 
58.3 
55.9 
57.1 
27.7 
16.8 
23.1 
44.5 
71.0 
57.1 
218.7 
139.7 
179.1 
Median 
Unit Size 
15.0 
16.0 
15.0 
8.0 
10.5 
9.0 
19.0 
25.0 
20.0 
34.0 
29.0 
30.0 
Range of 
Unit Size 
1-2,788 
1-3,922 
1-3,922 
1-360 
2-153 
1-360 
1-474 
1-2,073 
1-2,073 
1-10,759 
1-6,187 
1-10,759 
Average 
Delay from 
Petition to 
Election (Days) 
108.7 
128.1 
118.3 
62.1 
70.9 
83.9 
99.3 
71.2 
81.1 
86.3 
101.5 
93.5 
98.2 
112.7 
105.4 
Turnout 
86% 
85% 
85% 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
87% 
89% 
88% 
85% 
(turnover 
85% 
(turnover 
85% 
(turnover. 
Net Gain 
44,911 
45,304 
90,215 
2,133 
942 
3,075 
-1 ,754 
-1 ,114 
-2 ,868 
- 2 2 3 
27,057) 
- 7 5 
18,584) 
- 2 9 8 
45,641) 
90,124 
N.A. = not available. 
266 JURAVICH and BRONFENBRENNER 
As shown in table 16.1, unions won these elections with commanding 
margins, receiving, on average, 85 percent of the votes cast. Election turn-
outs were also extremely high: well above 85 percent. Despite suggestions 
that workers are no longer interested in unions (Farber 1987; Freeman and 
Rogers 1995), workers in the public sector are enthusiastically voting for 
union representation. 
The question that remains is, What accounts for the more than 35 per-
centage point difference in win rates between the private sector and the 
public sector? To provide insight into this question, we compared private-
sector data from Bronfenbrenner's 1986-87 study of NLRB election cam-
paigns with our data collected on public-sector certification elections 
(Bronfenbrenner 1993; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995b). 
We did find differences between the public and private sectors in election 
and employer background characteristics and bargaining unit demograph-
ics. Yet these differences suggested that win rates would be lower, not higher, 
in the public sector. For example, the number of days between the filing of 
a petition and the election was twice as high in the public sector, and 
workers organizing in the public sector tended to have much higher wages 
and better benefits than their private-sector counterparts, both characteris-
tics that have been found in the private sector to be associated with signifi-
cantly lower win rates (Bronfenbrenner 1993). Clearly, then, differences in 
election background and bargaining unit demographics do not account for 
the higher win rate in the public sector. 
Table 16.2 provides information on employer tactics used in both public-
and private-sector union elections. Here we found dramatic differences— 
namely, private employers are much more likely to oppose union organizing 
efforts. Whereas in the private sector every employer offered at least some 
opposition to the union campaign, in the public sector one-quarter of the 
employers offered no opposition whatsoever and the majority ran very 
weak campaigns with just a handful of meetings and letters. Private-sector 
employers were six times more likely to engage in unfair labor practices, 
including surveillance, discharges for union activity, threats, promises, and 
illegal wage increases, than public employers. Overall, 38 percent of private-
sector employers utilized five or more aggressive antiunion tactics, whereas 
only 8 percent of public-sector employers ran aggressive antiunion cam-
paigns. 
This high level of employer opposition, without sufficient restraints or 
remedies in labor legislation, has been shown to depress win rates in the 
private sector significantly (Bronfenbrenner 1993). Until very recently, a 
different labor relations dynamic existed in the public sector that served as 
a restraint on the use of this aggressive antiunion behavior. In part, this was 
because most public employers are elected officials, or beholden to public 
TABLE 16 .2 . Employer Tactics Used in Private- and Public-Sector Certification Elections 
No employer campaign15 
Employer discharged workers for union activity 
Complaints issued 
Fired workers not reinstated before the election 
Other ULPs filed 
Complaints issued on other ULPs 
Employer filed election objections 
Employer used consultant 
Employer used layoffs 
Antiunion committee used 
Employer used captive-audience meetings 
Number of captive-audience meetings 
Employer mailed letters 
Number of employer letters 
Employer distributed leaflets 
Number of employer leaflets 
Supervisors did one-on-one meetings 
Employer used media 
Employer gave wage increase 
Employer promoted leaders 
Employer made promises 
Management change after petition 
Employer campaign included more than five tactics0 
Sample 
Proportion 
or Mean 
.00 
.30 
.13 
.18 
.22 
.14 
.13 
.71 
.15 
.42 
.82 
5.50 
.80 
4.47 
.70 
5.98 
.79 
.10 
.30 
.17 
.56 
.21 
.38 
Private Sector 
Proportion 
or Mean 
for Wins 
.00 
.35 
.17 
.19 
.24 
.17 
.27 
.67 
.18 
.37 
.82 
3.97 
.79 
3.93 
.70 
5.41 
.79 
.13 
.23 
.19 
.44 
.20 
.34 
Percent 
Win 
Rate3 
0 (.43) 
.51 (.39) 
.58 (.40) 
.37 (.44) 
.47 (.41) 
.51 (.41) 
.51 (.41) 
.40 (.50) 
.53 (.41) 
.37 (.46) 
.43 (.42) 
N.A. 
.42 (.45) 
N.A. 
.43 (.42) 
N.A. 
.43 (.42) 
.52 (.41) 
.32 (.47) 
.47 (.42) 
.34 (.54) 
.41 (.54) 
.39 (.45) 
Sample 
Proportion 
or Mean 
.24 
.05 
.02 
.04 
.06 
.02 
.04 
.49 
.08 
.24 
.36 
2.21 
.36 
1.95 
.24 
1.60 
.43 
.18 
.10 
.07 
.27 
.10 
.08 
Public Sector 
Proportion 
or Mean 
for Wins 
.30 
.04 
.02 
.02 
.03 
.01 
.05 
.41 
.09 
.17 
.29 
1.22 
.27 
1.42 
.17 
1.51 
.37 
.13 
.10 
.08 
.23 
.06 
.03 
Percent 
Win 
Rate3 
.96 (.68) 
.60 (.76) 
.75 (.75) 
.43 (.76) 
.33 (.78) 
.33 (.76) 
.88 (.74) 
.63 (.86) 
.87 (.74) 
.52 (.82) 
.60 (.83) 
N.A. 
.57 (.85) 
N.A. 
.54 (.81) 
N.A. 
.65 (.82) 
.53 (.80) 
.79 (.74) 
.79 (.75) 
.63 (.79) 
.45 (.78) 
.33 (.78) 
a
 Number in parentheses is the percent win rate when the characteristic or tactic did not occur. 
b
 Employer did none of the following: captive-audience meetings; antiunion committees; antiunion letters; antiunion leaflets; supervisor one-on-ones; unscheduled wage 
increases during campaign; promises of improvements in wages, benefits, or working conditions; promotion of key union leaders; and media campaigns. 
c
 Employer campaign included more than five of the tactics listed above. 
Source: Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1994. 
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officials, and union avoidance in the public sector had been, until recently, 
politically unpopular. In the more than thirty states that have collective 
bargaining rights for at least some state and local workers, the net result 
was the development of a culture that was significantly more tolerant of 
unions than the private sector—until the past few years. 
This is not to suggest that there was no opposition in public-sector certi-
fication elections in 1991-92. Indeed, in some elections, union activists 
were illegally discharged, threats were made regarding layoff and privatiza-
tion, and other legal and illegal tactics common in the private sector, such 
as captive-audience meetings, supervisor one-on-ones, and antiunion com-
mittees, were used very effectively to undermine the union campaign. Many 
of these aggressive campaigns were concentrated in health-care and higher 
education units. This is not surprising given that public-sector higher educa-
tion and health-care employers are more insulated from public pressure 
than other state and local government employers. They are also more 
closely tied to their private-sector counterparts. 
Table 16.2 provides some startling evidence of what happens when public 
employers choose to aggressively oppose union organizing campaigns. 
When more than five antiunion tactics are utilized by public-sector employ-
ers, the win rate drops to 33 percent, even lower than the rate in the 
private sector after intensive employer campaigns. Clearly, if public-sector 
employers choose to oppose unionization, they have the tools to seriously 
undermine union organizing efforts. 
Although it is true that public-sector workers enjoy legal free speech 
rights and union access rights unheard of in the private sector, most state 
collective bargaining laws offer no better protection from aggressive em-
ployer antiunion behavior than does private-sector law (Bronfenbrenner 
and Juravich 1995a). In fact, since most public-sector laws are modeled on 
the National Labor Relations Act, and there has been so little case law 
developed in public-sector cases, many state labor boards turn to NLRB 
cases when looking for precedents to decide their public-sector organizing 
disputes. The data clearly show that if employers in the public sector choose 
to oppose unions, they have strong weapons at their disposal, and there is 
little likelihood of significant sanctions or penalties. 
These findings are particularly troubling given recent political changes 
and the changes in the culture of public-sector labor relations. Given the 
increasingly popular ideology of smaller government, politicians such as 
Governors Whitman of New Jersey and Pataki of New York have attacked 
public-sector workers and unions with unprecedented zeal, without the 
political costs traditionally associated with such antiunionism. Our data 
indicate that now that these cultural and political restraints are being lifted, 
the impact on public-sector organizing could be devastating. Particularly 
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given that our data from 1991-92 do not capture these relatively recent 
changes and may represent "golden years" in public-sector organizing, the 
impact of employer opposition on public-sector win rates may be even more 
dramatic. 
Union Tactics in the Public Sector 
So far, this discussion has assumed current levels of activity and current 
tactics and strategies by public-sector unions. Yet, as we know from the 
private sector, union tactics matter more than any other set of factors in 
organizing, including employer behavior (Bronfenbrenner 1997). In the pri-
vate sector, where aggressive employer opposition is the norm, union suc-
cess rates increase by more than 35 percentage points in campaigns in which 
organizers utilize a comprehensive grassroots union-building strategy that 
includes a focus on person-to-person contact, rank-and-file leadership de-
velopment, and escalating internal and external pressure tactics from the 
very beginning of the campaign. Such a strategy involves a combination of 
tactics, including establishing an active, representative organizing commit-
tee, using small-group meetings and house calls to develop leadership, inoc-
ulating against the employer campaign, and building support for the union 
campaign using solidarity days, community-labor coalitions, and job ac-
tions both to develop membership commitment and to pressure the em-
ployer, and building for the first contract during the organizing campaign. 
These tactics, when utilized as part of a comprehensive union-building cam-
paign, have been found in the private sector to be necessary ingredients for 
unions to successfully overcome intense employer opposition and the fear 
and intimidation it generates among the rank and file. 
The data for the public sector have similar implications, given its chang-
ing organizing climate. Compared with unions in the private sector, unions 
in the public sector are running very low-intensity organizing campaigns. 
As the figures in table 16.3 show, less t haa25 percent of the campaigns 
used representative committees, only 40 percent used house calling, and 
fewer used solidarity days or other more aggressive tactics. Like most pri-
vate-sector organizing campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of 
public-sector campaigns are limited to large- and small-group meetings and 
a limited number of letters and leaflets. 
Because of the relative lack of employer opposition, public-sector unions 
have still been able to win elections without running very aggressive and 
rank-and-file-intensive campaigns. Yet, even in this extremely favorable cli-
mate, only ninety thousand public-sector workers gain representation each 
year through new organizing. In fact, half the public-sector campaigns occur 
in units with fewer than fifteen eligible voters and 80 percent occur in units 
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with fewer than fifty eligible voters. The question then becomes, What kind 
of campaigns are necessary to organize more workers in much larger units, 
and, as employer opposition continues to intensify, what kind of tactics 
would be necessary to win? Given our finding that unions organizing in the 
public sector lose two-thirds of all elections in which there is intense em-
ployer opposition, it is clear that current organizing practice will have to 
change. 
The union tactics data summarized in table 16.3 provide some insight 
into how union tactics in the public sector must be modified to meet grow-
ing employer opposition. Under current practice, the intensity of the union 
campaign increases only minimally as the intensity of the employer cam-
paign increases. If we compare the 8 percent of the campaigns in which the 
employer ran aggressive antiunion campaigns with the 46 percent in which 
the union faced little or no employer opposition, we find that less than 
• one-third of the unions in the sample had an active representative commit-
tee, house called the majority of the unit, used solidarity days, elected the 
bargaining committee before the election, or signed at least 70 percent of 
the unit on cards before filing the petition. In fact, the primary response to 
more aggressive employer campaigns was a dramatic increase in the number 
of leaflets and mass mailings—from an average of 2.68 letters and 3.51* 
leaflets in campaigns with little or no employer opposition to 18.83 letters 
and 21.33 leaflets in campaigns with intensive employer opposition. 
Overall, the data suggest that unions will need to develop a much more 
aggressive grassroots response to employer opposition if they are going to 
have any success in a deteriorating public-sector organizing climate. For 
example, in medium campaigns in which employers used two to five anti-
union tactics, overall win rates averaged only 66 percent. But in those 
campaigns in which unions had cards signed by at least 70 percent of the 
unit before the petition was filed, the win rate increased to 87 percent; 
and in campaigns in which the union had a representative rank-and-file 
organizing committee, the win rate increased to 76 percent. Win rates were 
also 10 to 20 percentage points higher in units in which rank-and-file volun-
teers from already organized units conducted house calls, the union used 
solidarity days, and the union had at least one organizer on staff for every 
one hundred eligible voters. These tactics reflect both a more intense union 
effort and a more grassroots union-building strategy, as opposed to the 
more traditional public-sector organizing model, in which most of the union 
response is concentrated in letters and mass meetings. 
In the 8 percent of the campaigns with intensive employer opposition, 
unions in our sample lost all the elections in which they did not use an 
organizing committee, whereas use of a committee raised the win rate to 33 
percent. Committees representative of at least 10 percent of the unit made 
TABLE 16.3. Union Tactics Used in Public-Sector Elections 
HH&mm 
Overall Sample 
No or Weak Employer 
Campaign3 
Medium Employer 
Campaign3 
Intensive Employer 
Campaign3 
Sample Proportion Percent 
Proportion or Mean Win 
or Mean for Wins Rateb 
Sample Percent Sample Percent Sample Percent 
Proportion Win Proportion Win Proportion Win 
or Mean Rateb or Mean Rateb or Mean Rateb 
OUTCOME 
Election outcome 
First-contract outcome 
Postcontract membership 
UNION TACTICS 
Percent cards 
At least 70% cards 
Organizing committee used 
Percent on committee 
Representative committee 
Diagrammed workplace 
Percent house called 
50% or more house called 
Number of mass meetings 
Number of small-^group 
meetings 
Percent surveyed one-on-one 
Rank-and-file did house calls 
Solidarity days used 
.75 
.66 
.70 
.60 
.31 
.77 
.07 
.23 
.59 
.40 
.09 
4.82 
11.63 
.10 
.17 
.17 
1.00 
.88 
.72 
.63 
.38 
.77 
.07 
.23 
.53 
.40 
.07 
4.37 
10.34 
.11 
.17 
.19 
.75 (.00) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.92 (.68) 
.74 (.77) 
N.A. 
.77 (.75) 
.68 (.84) 
N.A. 
.56 (.77) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.76 (.76) 
.82 (.73) 
.90 
.81 
.67 
.60 
.36 
.70 
.06 
.16 
.46 
.39 
.06 
3.74 
6.90 
.10 
.08 
.13 
.90 (.00) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.97 (.86) 
.92 (.85) 
N.A. 
.93 (.89) 
.85 (.94) 
N.A. 
.80 (.91) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
1.00 (.94) 
1.00 (.88) 
.66 
.58 
.75 
.59 
.16 
.81 
.08 
.29 
.66 
.42 
.11 
5.14 
12.30 
.11 
.23 
.18 
.66 (.00) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.87 (.59) 
.67 (.65) 
N.A. 
.76 (.64) 
.66 (.67) 
N.A. 
.60 (.67) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.83 (.66) 
.75 (.64) 
.33 
.28 
.76 
.59 
.33 
1.00 
.08 
.33 
.93 
.33 
.20 
9.67 
36.87 
.09 
.25 
.33 
.33 (.00) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.80 (.10) 
.33 (.00) 
N.A. 
.40 (.30) 
.29 (1.00) 
N.A. 
.00 (.42) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
.00 (.33) 
.60 (.20) 
TABLE 16 .3 . Union Tactics Used in Public-Sector Elections (cont.) 
N o or Weak Employer Med ium Employer Intensive Employer 
Overall Sample Campaign21 Campaign a Campaign a 
Sample Proport ion Percent Sample Percent Sample Percent Sample Percent 
Propor t ion or M e a n Win Proport ion Win Proport ion Win Propor t ion Win 
or M e a n for Wins R a t e b or M e a n R a t e b or Mean R a t e b or M e a n R a t e b 
U N I O N TACTICS {cont.) 
Number of letters 4 .47 
Number of leaflets 6.07 
Dignity and fairness primary 
issues .38 
Bargaining committee before 
election .15 
At least one organizer per 
100 eligible voters 
Union used five or more 
rank-and-file tactics0 .09 
a
 The employer campaign breakdown was created as follows: "No or Weak Employer Campaign" includes all elections in which the employer ran no campaign or used only 
one tactic (46% of sample); "Medium Employer Campaign" includes all elections in which the employer used two to five antiunion tactics (46% of sample); "Intensive 
Employer Campaign" includes all elections in which the employer used more than five tactics (8% of sample). The antiunion tactics include: captive-audience meetings; 
antiunion committees; antiunion leaflets; supervisor one-on-ones; unscheduled wage increases during the campaign; promises of improvements in wages, benefits, or working 
conditions; promotion of key union leaders; and media campaigns. 
b
 Number in parentheses lists the percent win rate when the characteristic did not occur. 
c
 Rank-and-file tactics include the following practices: at least one steward per 30 eligible voters; stewards elected; union conducted orientation; regular membership 
meetings; regular newsletters; two or more grievances per month; grievance victories and losses publicized; stewards trained to organize around grievances; staff representative 
frequently visits workplace; internal organizing on meeting agenda; union used one-on-one contract survey; active rank-and-file organizing committee. 
3.21 N.A. 2 .60 N .A . 
4.59 N .A. 3.51 N .A. 
.36 .71 (.78) .35 .90 (.91) 
.16 .79 (.74) .14 1.00 (.88) 
.11 .89 (.74) .07 1.00 (.89) 
3.98 N .A. 18.73 N .A. 
6.16 N.A. 21 .33 N .A. 
.40 .63 (.69) .40 .17 (.44) 
.15 .69 (.66) .20 .33 (.33) 
.10 1.00 (.64) .16 .60 (.46) 
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an even greater difference; in this case, win rates increased to 40 percent. 
Similarly, the win rates increased to 80 percent if 70 percent of the bar-
gaining unit signed cards prior to filing the petition. The use of solidarity 
days increased the win rate to 60 percent, as opposed to 20 percent when 
they were not used. It is not that any one of these tactics is important 
individually, but they are all in some ways proxies for a more aggressive 
organizing campaign involving rank-and-file members in person-to-person 
contact and a grassroots campaign from the very beginning. In campaigns 
in which more than five rank-and-file tactics were used, win rates increased 
by 15 percentage points overall, 11 percentage points in units with moder-
ate employer opposition, and 14 percentage points in units with intense 
employer opposition. When included in regression and logit equations con-
trolling for the influence of election and unit background and employer 
tactic variables, the probability of the union winning the election increased 
by 6 percentage points and the percentage of the votes received by the union 
increased by 3 percentage points for each additional rank-and-file-intensive 
tactic used by the union during the organizing campaign (Bronfenbrenner 
and Juravich 1995c). 
Although these data are not as rbbust as they might be because of the 
relatively few elections during 1991-92 in which there was intense em-
ployer opposition, these findings support research from the private sector 
on the importance of rank-and-file grassroots strategies* (Bronfenbrenner 
1993). These data are also reinforced by our examination of first-contract 
and membership rates in the public sector (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
1995c). Given the high win rate there, first-contract and membership rates 
may be the best measures of the effectiveness of organizing campaigns. It is 
one thing to vote for a union that has a high likelihood of winning; it 
demonstrates a much greater level of commitment to choose to voluntarily 
join a union and pay dues. 
Table 16.4 provides data on the impact of union tactics on post-first-
contract membership rates. Clearly, the use of rank-and-file grassroots tac-
tics leads to significantly higher win rates. For example, representative 
rank-and-file organizing committees were used in only 3 percent of the 
campaigns that resulted in post-contract membership rates of less than 60 
percent. They were utilized in 34 percent of the campaigns that achieved 60 
percent to 90 percent membership, however, and 35 percent in those units 
that reached more than 90 percent membership. Only 38 percent of the 
members were house called in elections that yielded less than 60 percent 
membership, while 40 percent and 44 percent were house called in cam-
paigns that yielded 60 percent to 90 percent membership and more than 90 
percent membership, respectively. 
Overall, although none of the units that ended up with less than 60 
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TABLE 16.4. Union Tactics and Post-First-Contract Membership Rates 
UNION TACTICS 
Percent cards 
At least 70% cards 
Organizing committee used 
Percent on committee 
Representative committee 
Diagrammed workplace 
Percent house called 
50% or more house 
called 
Number of mass meetings 
Number of small-group 
meetings 
Percent surveyed 
one-on-one 
Rank-and-file did house 
calls 
Solidarity days used 
Number of letters 
Number of leaflets 
Dignity and fairness 
primary issues 
Bargaining committee 
before election 
Number of rank-and-file 
intensive tactics usedb 
Union campaign included 
five or more tactics 
At least one organizer per 
100 eligible voters 
Proportion 
or Mean for 
All Units 
with 
Contracts 
.63 
.39 
.77 
.07 
.25 
.56 
.40 
.07 
4.33 
10.13 
.10 
.17 
.19 
3.14 
4.63 
.37 
.15 
2.32 
.09 
.80 
Postcontract Membership Ratea 
Proportion 
or Mean with 
Less than 
60% 
Membership 
.58 
.22 
.78 
.04 
.03 
.57 
.28 
.03 
4.42 
8.11 
.03 
.14 
.19 
4.89 
5,28 
.36 
.03 
1.78 
.00 
.78 
Proportion 
or Mean with 
60-90% 
Membership 
.62 
.41 
.74 
.08 
.34 
.64 
.40 
.10 
4.50 
14.81 
.10 
.23 
.21 
2.05 
4.88 
.26 
.24 
2.55 
.07 
.76 
Proportion 
or Mean with 
90% or 
More 
Membership 
.67 
.48 
.80 
.09 
.35 
.46 
.44 
.07 
4.09 
7.57 
.17 
.13 
.17 
2.76 
4.04 
.46 
.15 
2.59 
.17 
.85 
a
 Twenty-nine percent of the elections in the sample had a postcontract membership rate of less than 60%, 
34% had a membership rate of between 60% and 90%, and 37% had a membership rate of 90% or more. 
b
 Rank-and-file tactics include the following: 70% or more of the unit signed cards before the petition 
was filed; union had a representative committee; union used small-group meetings; union house called the 
majority of the unit; union used rank-and-file volunteers to do house calls; dignity, fairness, and service 
quality primary issues; union used one-on-one contract surveys; and bargaining committee established 
before the election. 
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percent membership ran aggressive grassroots campaigns utilizing five or 
more union tactics, 7 percent of the units with 60 percent to 90 percent 
membership rates and 17 percent of the units with more than 90 percent 
membership rates ran more aggressive campaigns. When individual union 
tactics are combined into a single rank-and-file-intensive variable control-
ling for the impact of election and unit background and management tactics 
variables, the probability of the union achieving a postcontract membership 
rate of at least 60 percent increased by 9 percentage points, and the member-
ship rate increased by 6 percentage points for each additional rank-and-file-
intensive tactic the union used (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995c). 
Decertification and Challenge Elections in the Public Sector 
In addition to low win rates in elections in which public-sector employers 
choose to oppose the union, another indicator of the vulnerability of public-
sector unions in the current political climate is the high level of decertifica-
tion activity. Returning to table 16.1, a total of 162 single units decertified 
in 1991-92. In a dramatic departure from certification elections, unions in 
the public sector won in fewer than half of these elections. 
Even more troubling is the large number of challenge elections, in which 
a union tries to win representation for a unit already represented by another 
union. In fact, one of every six elections in the public sector is a multiunion 
challenge election. As reported in table 16.1, incumbent unions fare quite 
poorly, winning only 33 percent of challenge elections. Although more than 
ninety thousand workers in state and local government gained union repre-
sentation in 1991 and 1992, during the same period 2,868 chose to go 
nonunion, while another 45,641 simply switched from one union to an-
other. Clearly, this is a far-from-ideal organizing situation and one that will 
need to be changed dramatically if attacks on public-sector unions continue. 
The challenge process is also not a mechanism for larger unions to absorb 
smaller independents. In fact, unions were just as likely to leave the AFL-
CIO as to join through challenge elections. One of the findings of this 
research was that there has been a reemergence of a significant number of 
independent site-based unions. For all intents and purposes, these unions 
appeared to be little more than company unions associated with an earlier 
era in public-sector unionism. 
Although the win rates in certification elections look extremely favorable, 
they hide the fact that most of these elections occur in very small units. 
When combined with the relatively high level of decertification activity, 
this makes for a net gain in workers covered under public-sector collective 
bargaining agreements that is dwarfed by the hundreds of thousands of 
public-sector workers who lose union representation each year as a result 
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of layoffs and privatization. Further, as shown in table 16.4, a significant 
number of public-sector unions have not been able to translate their rela-
tively easy organizing victories into lasting union strongholds. Although 
unions won elections with victory margins that were higher than 85 percent, 
this translated into average membership rates of only 70 percent once the 
first contract was negotiated. For too many public-sector units, membership 
continues to drop in the years following the first agreement, until it reaches 
a point where a significant minority are ready to sign a decertification 
petition. 
In our intensive look at decertification elections, we examined factors 
that could possibly explain the high level of decertification activity and the 
extremely low win rates for incumbent unions. To begin with, we discovered 
that decertification and challenges are not rooted in worker dissatisfaction 
with their pay, benefits, or conditions. Nor are employers involved in any 
significant way in either single-union decertification or challenge elections 
in the public sector. 
Still, the nature of the original organizing campaigns did have a signifi-
cant impact on the outcomes of decertification and challenge elections. If 
they won the original organizing campaigns by a large margin, incumbents 
won only 60 percent of decertifications and challenges. But in units with 
small margins of victory, the win rates for incumbents rose to 87 percent. 
What these numbers seem to capture is that to win in the face of aggressive 
opposition, the unit must coalesce against the employer and in the process 
build a strong union. When the campaign is easy, there is little opportunity 
to become a cohesive organization. We are not suggesting that more em-
ployer opposition is needed to build stronger unions in the public sector but 
that, absent an aggressive employer campaign, public-sector unions will 
need to focus on other avenues of union building to create a union strong 
enough to withstand future challenges. 
As we can see from table 16.5, another major factor in how the incum-
bent union will fare in decertification and challenge elections is the qual-
ity and degree of union representation prior to the decertification petition 
being filed. For example, win rates for incumbent unions were 5 to 10 per-
centage points higher in units in which they had at least one steward per 
thirty eligible voters, conducted orientation for new employees, held regu-
lar membership meetings and published newsletters, publicized grievance 
victories and losses, and trained stewards to organize around grievances. 
Win rates were much lower in units in which stewards were appointed 
rather than elected, few grievances were filed, most grievances related to 
discipline and discharge, and the staff representative never visited the 
workplace. Bargaining practice mattered as well, so that win rates for in-
cumbent unions were much higher in units in which the union used a 
one-on-one contract survey and had an active rank-and-file bargaining com-
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mittee. Overall, incumbents won 68 percent of elections in units in which 
union practice and structure prior to filing the decertification petition re-
flected an organizing model, compared with 51 percent in units in which it 
did not. 
Our data also demonstrate that, once faced with a decertification or 
challenge election, an incumbent union needs to mount an organizing cam-
paign if it is to be successful. One reason that incumbents fare so poorly is 
that they often match an organizer employed by the challenging union 
against a servicing representative for the incumbent union. While the servic-
ing staff may be very good at handling grievances, negotiating local agree-
ments, and dealing with management, many servicing representatives have 
little or no experience with organizing. 
TABLE 16.5. Union Structure and Practice Prior to Decertification 
UNION STRUCTURE 
Ratio of stewards to eligible voters 
At least one steward per 30 eligible 
voters 
Stewards elected 
Stewards appointed 
Union conducted orientation for new 
employees 
Regular membership meetings 
Average number of membership 
meetings per year 
Union had regular newsletter 
Union filed few grievances 
Union averaged two or more 
grievances per month 
Most grievances related to discipline 
or discharge 
Union lost several major arbitrations 
Grievance victories and losses publicized 
Stewards trained to organize around 
grievances 
Staff rep frequently visited workplace 
Staff rep never visited workplace 
Internal organizing campaign conducted 
Internal organizing on meeting agenda 
BARGAINING PRACTICE 
Bargaining part of state-, city-, or 
county-wide negotiation 
All Decertification and Challenge Elections 
Mean or 
Proportion of 
Sample 
.05 
' .55 
.32 
.29 
.36 
.78 
5.93 
.42 
.53 
.16 
.22 
.10 
.17 
.09 
.55 
.07 
.38 
.27 
.10 
Mean or 
Proportion of 
Incumbent 
Wins 
.05 
.58 
.36 
.23 
.40 
.82 
5.67 
.46 
.49 
.17 
.19 
.05 
.22 
.10 
.54 
.05 
.37 
.28 
.10 
Percent 
Incumbent Win 
Rate2 
N.A. 
.62 (.54) 
.65 (.55) 
.46 (.63) 
.65 (.55) 
.61 (.48) 
N.A. 
.64 (.54) 
.54 (.63) 
.59 (.58) 
.50 (.61) 
.31 (.61) 
.74 (.55) 
.61 (.57) 
.58 (.59) 
.44 (.59) 
.57 (.59) 
.61 (.57) 
.62 (.58) 
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TABLE 16.5. Union Structure and Practice Prior to Decertification (cont.' 
All Decertification and Challenge Elections 
Mean or 
Mean or Proportion of Percent 
Proportion of Incumbent Incumbent Win 
Sample Wins Ratea 
BARGAINING PRACTICE (cont.) 
Union used one-on-one contract survey .50 
Bargaining conducted primarily by staff 
and officers 
Bargaining committee elected 
Bargaining committee small (less than 
5%) 
Most details of bargaining session 
remained confidential 
Active rank-and-file bargaining 
committee 
Union used inside pressure tactics 
Union used outside pressure tactics 
Union reached agreement before last 
contract expired 
Last contract never settled 
Union held strike 
OVERALL UNION STRUCTURE/PRACTICES 
Union used five or more elements of 
organizing model scaleb .43 
.56 .66 (.51) 
.75 
.45 
.75 
.57 
.34 
.00 
.13 
.33 
.02 
.03 
.72 
.47 
.78 
.58 
.36 
— 
.10 
.36 
.00 
.03 
.56 (.65) 
.62 (.55) 
.61 (.50) 
.59 (.57) 
.62 (.56) 
— 
.47 (.60) 
.64 (.56) 
.00 (.59) 
.50 (.58) 
.50 .68 (.51) 
a
 Number in parentheses lists the percent win rate when the characteristic did not occur. 
b
 Scale includes the following practices: at least one steward per 30 eligible voters; stewards elected; union 
conducted orientation; regular membership meetings; regular newsletters; two or more grievances per 
month; grievance victories and losses publicized; stewards trained to organize around grievances; staff 
representative frequently visits workplace; internal organizing on meeting agenda; union used one-on-one 
contract survey; active rank-and-file organizing committee. 
The nature of the incumbent union's organizing campaign matters as 
well. Just as we found in public- and private-sector certification election 
campaigns, the use of a grassroots rank-and-file-intensive union-building 
strategy was found to play a critical role in decertification and challenge 
election campaigns. As we can see from table 16.6, the use of active, repre-
sentative organizing committees boosts incumbents' win rates from 50 to 
84 percent. The use of solidarity days raises the win rate from 50 to 87 
percent. Similar effects are reported for the use of rank-and-file volunteers, 
one-on-one surveys, and house calling. Overall, win rates for incumbent 
unions average 68 percent when they run aggressive union-building cam-
paigns incorporating five or more rank-and-file-intensive tactics, compared 
with 49 percent when they do not. 
TABLE 16.6. Incumbent Union Tactics Used during Decertification Campaigns 
Single-Union Multiunion 
All Decertification and Challenge Elections Decertifications Challenge Elections 
Mean or 
Union did not conduct a campaign 
Union set up organizing committee 
Percent of unit represented on 
committee 
Active representative organizing 
committee 
Union actively used rank-and-file 
volunteers 
Union diagrammed workplace 
Union used house calls 
Union house called majority of unit 
Union held large-group meetings 
Number of meetings 
Union held small-group meetings 
Number of meetings 
Union used solidarity days 
Union used leaflets 
Number of leaflets 
Union used letters 
Number of letters 
Mean or 
Proportion 
of Sample 
.05 
.78 
.08 
.23 
.42 
.63 
.34 
.09 
.61 
5.04 
.61 
17.33 
.22 
.66 
8.75 
.75 
4.41 
Proportion of 
Incumbent 
Wins 
.00 
.87 
.09 
.33 
.45 
.73 
.36 
.08 
.56 
4.10 
.71 
12.10 
.33 
.76 
9.88 
.83 
5.02 
Percent 
Incumbent 
Win Ratea 
.00 (.61) 
.65 (.34) 
N.A. 
.84 (.50) 
.63 (.55) 
.67 (.43) 
.61 (.57) 
.50 (.59) 
.54 (.65) 
N.A. 
.67 (.44) 
N.A. 
.87 (.50) 
.67 (.41) 
N.A. 
.64 (.39) 
N.A. 
Mean or 
Proportion 
of Decerts 
.03 
.87 
.12 
.42 
.48 
.48 
.48 
.19 
.61 
6.58 
.65 
9.15 
.39 
.65 
6.17 
.87 
3.68 
Percent 
Incumbent 
Win Rate3 
.00 (.73) 
.74 (.50) 
N.A. 
.85 (.61) 
.80 (.63) 
.80 (.63) 
.67 (.75) 
.67 (.72) 
.74 (.67) 
N.A. 
.75 (.64) 
N.A. 
.92 (.58) 
.70 (.73) 
N.A. 
.70 (.75) 
N.A. 
Mean or 
Proportion of 
Challenges 
.06 
.78 
.07 
. .18 
.40 
.68 
.30 
.06 
.61 
4.53 
.60 
20.15 
.18 
. .66 
9.61 
.72 
4.72 
Percent 
Incumbent 
Win Rate3 
.00 (.58) 
.62 (.32) 
N.A. 
.83 (.48) 
.56 (.53) 
.64 (.33) 
.58 (.53) 
.33 (.56) 
.48 (.65) 
N.A. 
.65 (.39) 
N.A. 
.83 (.48) 
.66 (.31) 
N.A. 
.62 (.34) 
N.A. 
TABLE 16.6. Incumbent Union Tactics Used during Decertification Campaigns (cont.) 
Single-Union Multiunion 
All Decertification and Challenge Elections Decertifications Challenge Elections 
Mean or 
Union used one-on-one survey 
Union representatives/officers increased 
visits 
Union offered new benefits, services 
Union held rallies 
Union provided food or meals 
Union organized job actions 
Union held public forums or debates 
Union used media 
Union used polling 
Union involved community-labor 
groups 
Union distributed trinkets 
Union distributed items of value 
Union used five or more tacticsb 
Mean or 
Proportion 
of Sample 
.13 
.78 
.22 
.16 
.31 
.02 
.13 
.07 
.26 
.16 
.21 
.02 
.49 
Proportion of 
Incumbent 
Wins 
.18 
.83 
.17 
.17 
.32 
.01 
.12 
.06 
.26 
.14 
.19 
.03 
.58 
Percent 
Incumbent 
Win Rate" 
.78 (.55) 
.63 (.43) 
.45 (.62) 
.62 (.58) 
.61 (.57) 
.50 (.58) 
.53 (.59) 
.56 (.58) 
.57 (.59) 
.50 (.60) 
.54 (.59) 
.67 (.58) 
.68 (.49) 
Mean or 
Proportion 
of Decerts 
.13 
.74 
.16 
.26 
.00 
.03 
.00 
.10 
.00 
.19 
.00 
.00 
.58 
Percent 
Incumbent 
Win Rate3 
1.00 (.67) 
.74 (.63) 
.60 (.73) 
.75 (.70) 
— 
1.00 (.70) 
— 
.67 (.71) 
— 
.67 (.72) 
-
-
.78 (.62) 
Mean or 
Proportion of 
Challenges 
.14 
.79 
.23 
.13 
.40 
.01 
.17 
.06 
.34 
.16 
.27 
.03 
.47 
Percent 
Incumbent 
Win Rate3 
.71 (.52) 
.59 (.36) 
.42 (.58) 
.54 (.54) 
.61 (.50) 
.00 (.55) 
.53 (.55) 
.50 (.55) 
.57 (.53) 
.44 (.56) 
.54 (.55) 
.67 (.54) 
.65 (.45) 
a
 Number in parentheses equals win rate when characteristic did not occur. 
b
 Union tactics include: active representative organizing committee, active rank-and-file volunteers, diagramming workplace, house calls, small-group meetings, solidarity 
days, leaflets, letters, one-on-one survey, rallies. 
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Conclusions 
In many ways the situation in the public sector is not unlike that in the 
private sector twenty years ago. Just as private-sector unionists in the early 
1970s had many reasons to believe that their membership levels and bar-
gaining power would continue to thrive whether or not they engaged in 
massive new organizing, many public-sector unionists continue to feel rela-
tively secure about both the employment picture and the labor relations 
climate.3 Yet important and significant threats are on the horizon that are 
beginning to fundamentally alter the situation that public-sector unions 
have come to know and expect. Just as twenty years ago the private sector 
began to face the growth of multinational corporations and an unpredicted 
wave of plant closings and concession contracts, the public sector is facing 
the devolution of government and massive privatization schemes. 
In retrospect, the initial response by private-sector unions to the crisis 
was woefully inadequate. The commitment and dedication of trade union-
ists were not the problem, but many continued to see and approach very 
dramatically changed circumstances with the same attitudes, tools, and 
practices they had learned and used in the past. Rather than turning to 
community-labor coalitions, active membership mobilization, or new or-
ganizing, most private-sector unions held on to a fairly traditional top-down 
servicing and bargaining model honed in the 1950s and 1960s. New or-
ganizing was one of the first things to flounder as employers became em-
boldened with a variety of legal and illegal tactics. 
This research demonstrates the cost if public-sector workers and unions 
are similarly unresponsive to the challenges they face. Because of the relative 
lack of employer opposition in the public sector, a culture and practices 
have developed that promote and reinforce a traditional top-down model 
in servicing, bargaining, and new organizing, with a primary emphasis on 
shoring up union power through lobbying in city halls, state legislatures, 
and governors' mansions. Although these approaches may have been suffi-
cient in the past, they are clearly inadequate for the future. Given growing 
employer opposition to organizing, public antipathy toward government 
workers, and the increasing risk of decertification and challenges, public-
sector unions must both strengthen their existing units and build strong and 
active unions in newly organized units that can withstand these many inter-
nal and external challenges. 
3. There is also little recognition of the seriousness of the attack on the public sector in the 
industrial relations community. For example, "Collective Bargaining Outlook for 1995" 
(Sleemi 1995) doesn't even mention the new threats in the public sector. In fact, one section 
heading states simply "New Year, Same Issues." 
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As the findings on the certification, decertification, and challenge process 
show us, building unions in the public sector will require more commitment 
to the use of rank-and-file grassroots tactics. The data speak to the impor-
tance of rank-and-file activism and of mobilizing public-sector union mem-
bership and community support. Given the level of attack, union staff and 
officers will clearly be unable to solve these problems alone. Although per-
haps less dramatic at this point, unions in the public sector, like their coun-
terparts in the private sector, are reaching the limits of service-based 
unionism. 
Particularly given the small size of many of the units being organized and 
the increasing fractionalization of public-sector employment, it is unlikely 
that union staff will have the capacity to "service" members in the same 
way as was done in basic manufacturing or in large geographically specific 
units in the public sector. More important, only through union building will 
public-sector unions be able to organize new members in the face of grow-
ing employer opposition and to defend their existing members from privat-
ization schemes and political attack. 
The stakes are very high. The stability of public-sector unionism in the 
1970s and 1980s cushioned the dramatic decline in the private sector and 
has in important ways provided a base for rebuilding the labor movement. 
A number of signs, including the new leadership at the AFL-CIO, suggest 
that this renewal is well under way. Yet, as the painful experience of private-
sector unions demonstrates, fortunes can change dramatically. A significant 
decline in public-sector unionism not only would have a tremendous impact 
on public-sector workers and their families but could very well threaten the 
entire labor movement. Given current union density, even a relatively mod-
est downturn could be devastating. 
As this research also suggests, a decline in the public sector is not inevita-
ble. Even with growing employer opposition, rank-and-file, grassroots 
union-building strategies are effective in winning certification elections and 
first contracts and in achieving high membership rates. As we have seen, 
these same tactics also inoculate units and unions from both challenge and 
decertification elections. The message is clear. Public-sector unions today 
face both great opportunities and great risk. Like their private-sector coun-
terparts twenty years earlier, they can wait until their ranks are decimated 
and their power severely diminished before they refocus their efforts and 
vision on new organizing. Or they can learn from the lessons of the past 
and start strengthening existing units and aggressively and effectively or-
ganizing new units before employer opposition and a deteriorating eco-
nomic and political climate take their toll. 
